The correlation between the debt and equity markets’ measures of risk has been extremely strong over the recent years. External shocks, for example the tragic events of September 11, 2001, the LTCM disaster in 1998 or the Asian crisis, have a substantial impact on credit spreads as well as on implied equity volatility. Consider the relationship between implied volatility of call options on Dow Jones Euro Stoxx 50, and the spread versus government bonds of the MSCI Euro corporate bond index.

One way of interpreting implied volatility on an equity index is as the compensation that the investors receive for taking on equity risk. The index of credit spreads represents the additional yield investors demand for holding corporate debt over benchmark government debt. While there have at times been brief periods of divergence, these two risk measures typically move together. For example, in 1993/94 banks in the United States cleaned up their balance sheets by writing down nonperforming assets, causing the VIX index, representing the implied volatility of put and call options on the S&P 100, to fall to a historical low just above 10 percent. The decline in implied equity volatility triggered a credit spread rally. Asimilar thing happened in 2002. Average credit spreads collapsed by half, as did optionimplied volatility. So the decline in volatility was a major driver of credit spread tightening. However, one tends to find that when implied volatility falls below a certain threshold the effect of small changes on spreads is rather subdued.

The level of implied volatility is a widely used indicator for risk appetite, and, on the individual company level, for the uncertainty related to future earnings. It is also considered a good measure of equity-market risk, because the higher the implied volatility the higher the price of equity options, and thus the higher the cost of insuring against equity-market downturns. Corporate bond spreads reflect the compensation that the investors demand for taking on credit risk. While the debt and equity markets’ estimates of risk, as explained by the Merton model, tend to move together, temporary disconnections do occur. The combination of low levels of implied equity volatility and wide credit spreads suggests the potential for the credit spreads to tighten, as the divergence in the equity and credit market eventually gets corrected. Conversely, when implied equity volatility appears high relative to credit spreads, credit markets are more optimistic about business risks in the corporate sector. The decoupling in the second half of 2003, however, was not an indication that credit spreads were rich relative to implied equity volatility. Rather credit markets were faster to cash in on the reduced risks in the corporate sector because of the massive balance sheet deleveraging, especially in the telecom sector.

Corporate managers were selling off assets, issuing equity and keeping cash for the debtholders, as opposed to using the cash to buy back stock for the first time in 10 years. By the end of the year, equity volatility came down significantly, closing the gap in the assessment of risk.

Credit spreads historically have been negatively correlated with 3-year rolling equity-market returns, as we would have expected from the Merton model. Indeed, there seems to be a longer term debt–equity cycle. But the chart also reveals a significant decoupling of equity and credit during the 1990s. Since equity-market performance alone is only temporarily able to explain variations of credit spreads, we will now analyze the impact of equity volatility on spreads. However, most of the time equity prices and implied volatility tell the same story. When stock prices are falling, demand for protection increases, and thus volatility, which is simply the price of protection, rises. The result is a strong negative correlation between equity prices and option-implied volatility. Yet the times, when both markets tell different stories, are the most interesting.

Phase 3 is characterized by high growth and rising leverage, as during the years 1997 to mid-2000. In this period M&A activity was rapidly accelerating, driven by a major focus on the creation of shareholder value. While earnings grew in this period, aggregate measures of corporate profitability like the ratio of after-tax profits of the nonfinancial corporate sector to GDP already declined. Deteriorating free cash flow measures also signaled heightened risk in the corporate sector. As one would generally expect in the expansion phase, equities performed well while credit spreads widened. In general, the high level of debt accumulated during the expansion makes companies vulnerable to economic downturns. Low growth and rising leverage increase the risk of defaults and rating downgrades, and are generally negative for credit as well as equity markets. The years 2000–02 are a typical example for this phase.

After the 1990/91 recession the US corporate sector underwent a period of massive restructuring. Balance sheet repair, rights issues to repay debt, asset disposals and measures to improve cash flow generation led not only to falling leverage, but also to low earnings growth rates. During this first phase of the debt–equity cycle, the ‘repair phase’ credit usually outperforms equities. It lays the foundation for higher growth rates due to an improved ability to generate cash flows. The subsequent recovery period is beneficial for equity markets as well as credit markets, as the years 1994–97 have shown.

Clearly credit and equity investors tend to look at the corporate sector from different angles. While the focus of equity markets is primarily on earnings growth, credit investors rely on debt-related factors to make their decisions. However, if one combines both perspectives the result is a stylized debt–equity cycle that may support both parties in the process of decision-making. The four phases of the cycle depend on the degree of earnings growth (high or low) and changes in leverage (rising or falling). Changes in leverage reflect the companies’ efforts to change their capital structure as well as their ability to generate cash flows. As an example we will examine the last complete debt–equity cycle that reached from 1991 to 2003.

Many investors try to avoid these troublesome relationships by using online brokers. Online investing is promoted as fun. Chat rooms, IPOs, after-hours trading, 24-hour research: The message is: meet interesting people and make quick, easy money. The results are not any better than using a live-body broker.

Studies show switching to low-commission, online brokers leads to overconfidence. Stocks are bought and sold online in seconds. Online research takes hours if done quickly, days and weeks if done properly. Online investors skip the research and go directly to the trading page. This causes excessive trading, which quickly adds up to excess commissions, large spreads, great unhappiness, and poor results. A few investors become addicted to trading.

Investors using online brokers often turn to chat rooms to get comfort during volatile markets. Chat rooms are full of investors trying to promote their own shares. Their agenda is to get you out of your shares and into theirs at ever-higher prices. Rumors and mass hysteria are treated as fact in chat rooms. Your gullibility will hurt you.

Cautious investors often place stop-loss orders on their account. These orders sell out your shares should they decline by the amount of pain you anticipate you are willing to endure. Stop-loss orders are supposed to make an unmanageable situation manageable. Brokers encourage this as stock fluctuations inevitably trigger sales creating more commissions and spreads.

In a market break, the sell point may be much lower than the level you specify. For example, on a surprising corporate announcement, it is common for prices to gap down by $10 or more. Your stop loss may have only been down $2, but you will be sold out at the next trade, $10 lower. Of course, you always have the opportunity to buy back in again for more commissions and increasingly wide spreads. Stop-loss orders often lead to anger and frustration as an attempt to bring order to an unmanageable situation fails for you, yet enriches your broker.

Brokerage accounts also offer you a “parking place” for your cash. These are sweep accounts: money market funds that collect dividends and the change leftover from trades. In the old days, dividend checks and change were sent to your home and you had the onerous task of depositing them in your checking account. The sweep accounts are marketed as a great convenience to you. In fact, they are a great convenience to your broker as they gather your funds within short distance of the trading desk. Again, particularly optimistic types should have the dividends sent home. Maybe there is only $1,000 at stake, but would you rather have a new couch to lie on during the bear market or would you prefer to whittle it away in commissions, spreads, and poor stock picks?

In every margin scenario, you may note, the broker collects larger commissions and more spreads than in a simple purchase-and-hold scenario. More shares are used in the transaction, plus the transaction inevitably involves a purchase, a sale, and margin interest.

Overconfidence in your investment ability is the main cause of margin investing. It is not a coincidence that the highest margin on record, $279 billion dollars, occurred at the peak of the NASDAQ in March 2000. Five years of 20 percent plus returns led investors to believe they could handle margin. Margin investing is best left to speculators or those with an admitted desire to lose their fortune. Optimists will be happier with a buy-andhold strategy. Even after the worst bear market, they will still own their stocks, assuming no bankruptcies, and have the opportunity to again hope for a great rise.

Comfort zone investing does not mean you become a flawless investor or a spiritual giant. For most people, striving for financial maturity is a process of self-discovery and self-acceptance, not a process of self-improvement.

To achieve serenity in investing, once you know how you relate to different investments, you do not have to change who you are; you simply need to change your investments to fit you. Often in marriage or work relationships, you must change yourself if you are to be happy, because your spouse or boss is not about to change. Changing yourself is much more difficult and painful than changing your investments.

Changing investments is not, however, entirely cost free. Switching from stocks to real estate, for example, incurs taxes, commissions, closing fees, research, and assessment hours, as well as other monetary, time, and effort costs. There are social costs as well. You may have to reach outside office norms to find what works for you. If you are a real estate guy and the firm only offers 401(k)s with no REIT option and lots of free company stock, you might have to explain to your colleagues why you put nothing in the plan and spend weekends driving around looking at shopping centers.